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THE POLITICAL URGENCY OF BLACK
MANHOOD: FREDERICK DOUGLASS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
John M. Kang*

ABSTRACT
How did Frederick Douglass—one who was born a slave, one who
had been denied all formal education, one who had been sundered
from his family, one who had been starved, tortured, and, on
occasion, nearly killed—manage to muster the courage to do
something as bold as challenge the United States Supreme Court?
This Article suggests that Douglass, in order to assert his right as
an American citizen, first had to assert his right as a man in an
explicitly gendered sense. That is, Douglass had to muster a
powerful sense of manliness that could elevate him
psychologically to assert his right to equal citizenship under the
Constitution. He had to generate a potent faith in his own
gendered identity in order to overcome the debilitating political
stigma that attached to his racial identity. Only by doing this, was
Douglass able to make the powerful claim that he was entitled—
as an American citizen—to contest the authority of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Part I sets the historical backdrop by discussing the infamous
Supreme Court case of Dred Scott v. Sandford. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney argued that the Founding
Fathers could never have intended to include blacks as citizens
because blacks were utterly emasculated victims of the former’s
masculine imposition of white supremacy. Part II summarizes how
there was conspicuous support in the civil society of the South for
the racist worldview represented by Chief Justice Taney. What
Frederick Douglass encountered, then, was not only a racist
Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Taney but a coterie of
racist authorities in Southern society. Part III will introduce a
thesis for how Douglass mustered the psychological resources to
challenge the racist assertions of Chief Justice Taney and his ilk.
Part III delves into Douglass’s autobiography for answers. There,
one finds a compelling narrative of an adolescent boy who had
*
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been born into slavery. Douglass describes how white supremacy,
as enacted through the practice of slavery, was designed to prevent
a black male child from developing anything resembling a sense
of his manhood. Eventually, the young Douglass would find a
redemptive manhood through an ordeal of intense violence. It was
this crucial event that galvanized him to assert himself as a citizen
of the United States, and, hence, as one who was entitled to
challenge the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dred Scott.
Part IV examines the substance of Douglass’s assertions. In lieu
of the idiom of hypermasculinity that had been enlisted by Chief
Justice Taney, Douglass opted for textualism. As Part IV will
discuss, however, Douglass did not completely renounce the idiom
of manliness. As he would make clear in his most famous public
speech, Douglass reclaimed the image of the Founding Fathers
from that sketched by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott. What
made the Founding Fathers great, Douglass argued, was not their
fealty to the hypermasculine anthems of white supremacy. What
made them great, he explained, was that they aspired to be morally
upright gentlemen who embraced the virtues of equal respect and
civility toward all, regardless of race. As Part IV will elaborate,
Douglass stressed that the Founding Fathers had failed to fulfill
their own ethical aspirations, but the white sons who were
listening to him in 1852 could do so by working bravely to end
slavery and racism. Douglass thereby propounded a conception of
manhood that was compatible with an egalitarian interpretation
of the Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
In 1818, he was born into slavery.1 He endured it for twenty years.2 As a
young child, he was sundered from his mother and separated from his siblings.3 He
was bought and sold.4 He was psychologically tortured and physically assaulted by
his ostensive owners and their subordinates.5
Notwithstanding these ordeals, Frederick Douglass would become perhaps
the most important black leader in the history of the United States.6 Blessed with a
formidable talent for words, Douglass tirelessly published antislavery articles in his

1. See, e.g., DAVID W. BLIGHT, FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PROPHET OF FREEDOM 9 (2018).
2. See, e.g., FREDERICK DOUGLASS, My Bondage and My Freedom, in AUTOBIOGRAPHIES:
NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM, LIFE AND TIMES 103, 419 (1994); BLIGHT,
supra note 1, at xiv, 672.
3. See, e.g., DOUGLASS, supra note 2, at 149; BLIGHT, supra note 1, at 12, 50.
4. See, e.g., DOUGLASS, supra note 2, at 236–37; BLIGHT, supra note 1, at 176.
5. See, e.g., DOUGLASS, supra note 2, at 260–65, 270–76, 277–87; BLIGHT, supra note 1, at 60–66.
6. See, e.g., BLIGHT, supra note 1, at xiv–vi; WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., THE MIND OF FREDERICK
DOUGLASS, at ix (1984).
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own newspaper.7 Douglass’s campaign against slavery was also articulated through
his best-selling autobiography where he recounted the personal horrors endured
under slavery.8 No less important, Douglass was an electrifying speaker and he
barnstormed cities, both in the United States and Europe, where he urged audiences
to abolish slavery.9 Indeed, according to his definitive biographer, Douglass was at
once the most important abolitionist in American history and the most sought-after
speaker of his time.10 Government officials took stock of Douglass’s power; they had
no choice. Eventually, President Abraham Lincoln met directly with Douglass in the
White House—the first time that a black person had been so invited. For Lincoln
recognized how deeply he depended on Douglass, the one leader who could persuade
blacks to support the President’s initiatives.11 Douglass, however, was not an
unconditional collaborator. He pressed Lincoln to do more to abolish slavery, and,
over time, the ex-slave would become a vocal critic of, but also adviser to, Lincoln.12
A testament to his stature and influence, Douglass has been lauded by diverse
audiences. It is telling that, on the one hand, the conservative Justice Clarence
Thomas evoked Douglass to reject race-based affirmative action as unconstitutional,
while the liberal President Barack Obama plans—as of the writing of this Article—
to produce a film to celebrate Douglass’s life as a monumental black leader.13
There is much in Douglass’s life that invites the public’s interest, but within
the legal academy, scholars have been drawn to his creative interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution.14 More than an exercise in the craft of exegesis, Douglass’s
interpretation was an acutely personal affair. For Douglass argued that the
Constitution, if read correctly, was antithetical to the practice of slavery.15
Specifically, Douglass insisted that the Constitution, notwithstanding wording to the
contrary in some of its sections, treated blacks as entitled to the equal citizenship
enjoyed by their white counterparts.16 What made Douglass’s position particularly
noteworthy was that he, a slave who had been brutally oppressed, refused to honor
the lofty authority of the United States Supreme Court.17 In the now infamous case
7. See, e.g., BLIGHT, supra note 1, at 190–96.
8. See, id. at xvii, 137–39.
9. See, e.g., id. at 116, 128, 163, 170–77, 185, 188.
10. As Professor Blight comments in his definitive biography of Douglass, “It is likely that more
Americans heard Douglass speak than any other public figure of his times.” Id. at xiv. For related
discussion, see also id. at 5, 98, 136, 470.
11. Id. at 437.
12. Id. at 5–8, 359, 373–74, 436–37.
13. Rachel Yang, Barack and Michelle Obama Set ‘The Fifth Risk,’ Frederick Douglass Biopic
Among Initial Netflix Projects, VARIETY (Apr. 30, 2019), https://variety.com/2019/film/news/barackobama-michelle-higher-ground-productions-announces-seven-upcoming-netflix-projects-1203201329/.
14. E.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 31, 38, 76, 187, 192 (1988); Sanford
Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1087, 1099–1100 (1993);
Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 423,
427 (2012); Paul Gowder, Reconstituting We the People: Frederick Douglass and Jurgen Habermas in
Conversation, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 335, 373–83 (2019); Asifa Quarishi, Interpreting the Qur’an and the
Constitution: Similarities in the Use of Text, Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and American
Jurisprudence, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 67, 76 (2006).
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part IV.
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of Dred Scott v. Sanford, the Court had held that blacks, whether slaves or born free,
were never intended by the Constitution’s Framers to be recognized as citizens.18
Writing the Court’s judicial opinion, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney declared that
blacks, simply by virtue of their race, could be enslaved.19 Douglass rejected the
authority of the Court, and he thereby forwarded the proposition that the Constitution
may, and should, be interpreted by the citizens themselves.20 Douglass therefore
called into doubt the authority of America’s highest Court.21 He did it, moreover,
with unusual skill and panache. His published arguments were sophisticated and
brimmed with a vivacious sarcasm that refused to submit to the claims of white
supremacy. That Douglass’s arguments were the products of a former slave who had
been denied formal education made them the subject of curiosity for legal scholars.
Understandably, then, legal scholars have focused on the conceptual coherence of
Douglass’s statements along with their evidential merits and their rhetorical
persuasiveness, things that would be of interest to those trained in the law.
What tends to receive much less attention from legal scholars is the
psychological aspects of Douglass’s interpretation of the Constitution. Namely, few,
if any, legal scholars have examined how Douglass’s interpretation was motivated
and governed by the logic of manhood. The omission is unfortunate. For in his
speeches, editorials, and autobiography, Douglass was clearly obsessed with
manhood and its associated tropes of patriarchy, emasculation, and violence.22 It was
in part through the conceptual prism of manhood that Douglass made sense of why
Taney’s interpretation of the Constitution was flawed and why an alternative was in
order, or so this Article will argue. By choosing to dwell on the theme of manhood,
this Article does not foreclose the possibility that Douglass drew from other sources
such as natural rights philosophy, Christianity, and Enlightenment principles of
equality; for he did, and copiously so.23 However, this Article will endeavor to
supplement the literature relating to Douglass by suggesting that manhood was a
salient paradigm by which he came to comprehend the Constitution’s meaning.
While the Article is a work of historical retrieval, it is also meant to serve
more contemporary interests. For Douglass provides a potentially attractive
paradigm of manhood in our present-day culture where too many men have indulged
an ethos of what today goes by the name of “toxic masculinity.” According to the
logic of toxic masculinity, to become a sufficiently masculine man in today’s culture
entails the fulfillment of a lust for domination and violence as its own end.24 Born in
1818, Douglass would not have heard the exotic neologism of toxic masculinity, but
as a slave who had been brutalized by those who were consumed by toxic

18. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426–27 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. For discussion of Dred Scott, see infra Part I.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Parts III, IV.
23. MARTIN, supra note 6, at 20–21, 144–45, 233.
24. See generally JARED YATES SEXTON, THE MAN THEY WANTED ME TO BE: TOXIC MASCULINITY
AND A CRISIS OF OUR OWN MAKING (2019); MICHAEL KIMMEL, GUYLAND: THE PERILOUS WORLD
WHERE BOYS BECOME MEN (2009); CLEMENTINE FORD, BOYS WILL BE BOYS: POWER, PATRIARCHY
AND TOXIC MASCULINITY (2019).
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masculinity, he had known too well what it meant as a matter of practice.25 In
response, Douglass, over time, developed an alternative account of what it meant to
be a proper man, and this account was understood by Douglass as consonant with
being a proper citizen of the Constitution.26
Douglass’s conception of manhood was animated in large part by two moral
tenets. The first tenet entailed that he should abjure the domination of others, but that
he should also refuse to accept being dominated.27 The second tenet required him to
shun opportunities to inflict violence on others, but required too that he should
courageously enlist violence to deflect the violence that was inflicted upon him.28
Douglass thus embodied the virtues of a gentleman in their compound parts: he was
gentle in adhering to the norms of civility, but he was also manly in summoning his
physical courage.29 Present-day readers may bristle at such seeming celebrations of
male identity, but the need to restore one’s self-esteem was a desperate priority for a
young Frederick Douglass in the mid-nineteenth century. His manhood, one must
remember, had been nearly pummeled out of existence by the emasculating forces
of slavery.30 In the eyes of white supremacists, a male slave who nurtured a sense of
manliness was a slave who would insist on his freedom, and hence a dangerous being
who could not be tolerated.31
This Article is dedicated to examining the origins of Douglass’s manliness
and how it relates to his thoughts about citizenship, political rights, and constitutional
interpretation. Although the subject of the Article is Frederick Douglass, the Article
does not discuss him in earnest until the second half. The reason for this seemingly
belated introduction is owing to the Article’s desire to furnish for the reader the
historical context of slavery. For slavery figures profoundly in Douglass’s
understanding of manliness and its relationship to the Constitution. Absent such
background information, the reader will be left with a woefully incomplete record of
what Douglass meant as a theorist of manliness and the Constitution.
Accordingly, Part I sets the historical backdrop by discussing the
significance of the aforementioned Dred Scott v. Sandford. Dred Scott is one of the
most famous Supreme Court cases in the history of the United States and almost
certainly its most infamous. What the Court decided in Dred Scott in effect
reinforced Douglass’s identity as a slave, and Douglass dedicated much of his adult
life to challenging the legitimacy of the Court’s holding in Dred Scott. After all, Dred
Scott was no ordinary case. It was the case where the Supreme Court held in 1857
that the Founding Fathers never intended for the U.S. Constitution to include blacks

25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part III.
29. None of this is to suggest, of course, that courage is a virtue that is limited to men. Women have
obviously demonstrated its possession, often in much larger quantities than men, and will continue to do
so. However, for better or worse, there is a cultural connection between courage and what it means to be
a suitable man. See John M. Kang, Does Manly Courage Exist?, 13 NEV. L.J. 467, 467–68 (2013).
30. See infra Part III.
31. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, in AUTOBIOGRAPHIES,
supra note 2, at 15; see also DOUGLASS, My Bondage and My Freedom, in AUTOBIOGRAPHIES, supra
note 2, at 297.

346

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

as American citizens.32 The Dred Scott Court thus also decided that the Constitution
never intended for blacks to be afforded those rights and privileges that the
Constitution had afforded white citizens.33 Dred Scott thus rendered futile the
attempt by blacks to assert standing as American citizens. The result was that blacks
who were enslaved could not sue in a federal court based on the claim that their rights
as citizens had been denied.34
Given that Dred Scott turned on issues of standing in the federal courts, it
is logical why legal scholars tend to home in on such issues. Part I will address a
different aspect of the case, however, one that is more pertinent for the Article’s
chosen subject of manhood and its relationship to race. As Part I will discuss, it was
not only Douglass who was fixated on manhood. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney,
writing for the Court in Dred Scott, justified his decision to deny blacks citizenship
by turning to the tropes of masculinity. Taney argued that the Founding Fathers could
never have intended to include blacks as citizens because blacks were utterly
emasculated victims of the former’s masculine imposition of white supremacy. In
Taney’s narrative, whites were entitled to citizenship because they could trace their
racial heritage to Anglo-Saxon Founders who had distinguished themselves as heroes
by venturing the harrowing journey across the Atlantic to establish a self-governing
republic. As Part I will recount, Taney took pains to underscore that blacks had first
set foot on America’s shores in an entirely different manner, not as heroes, but as a
vanquished, and hence degraded, race of slaves. For Taney, the difference was
critical, as Part I will explain. According to Taney’s judicial opinion in Dred Scott,
whites, through their exertion of masculine will, had both founded a republic and
enslaved a race of blacks to support it. However, for Taney, blacks had shown
themselves as a feeble race that had been enslaved by a stronger one. Described in
gendered terms, whites for Taney had proven themselves as extraordinarily manly
while blacks had shown themselves as emasculated victims, as Part I will suggest.
Taney conscripted this ethos of Might Makes Right as the normative platform for his
judicial decision in Dred Scott, as Part I will show.
In mid-nineteenth century America, Taney and his fellow justices were not
alone. Part II summarizes how there was conspicuous support in the civil society of
the South for the racist worldview represented by Taney in Dred Scott. What made
the support particularly noteworthy, Part II will explain, was that it came from
leading white intellectuals in the South: sociologists, legal scholars, political figures,
and scientists. These experts enlisted the power of their authority to advocate for
slavery. Specifically, they insisted that there was ample empirical evidence to
establish that blacks were every bit as unmanly as Taney had described. But it was
more than unmanliness that was the subject of the pro-slavery advocates. As will be
discussed in Part II, a thesis shared among these white supremacists was that the
depth of the black’s unmanliness was evinced in his yearning for—not his resistance
to—slavery, and, in particular, his yearning to be under the authority and protection

32. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment,
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
33. See infra Part I.
34. See infra Part I.
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of a white patriarchal master. In the unvarnished propaganda of pro-slavery
advocates, slavery was thus reconfigured as a moral remedy, not an immoral vice.
What Frederick Douglass encountered, then, was not only a racist Supreme
Court headed by Chief Justice Taney but a coterie of racist authorities in Southern
society. Part III will introduce a thesis for how Douglass mustered the psychological
resources to challenge the racist assertions of Chief Justice Taney and his ilk. Part
III will delve into Douglass’s autobiography for answers. There, one finds a
compelling narrative of an adolescent boy who had been born into slavery. In his
autobiography, Douglass describes how white supremacy, as enacted through the
practice of slavery, was designed to prevent a black male child from developing
anything resembling a sense of his manhood. Part III will recount the appalling
episodes in which Douglass, as a boy, was whipped, pummeled, and threatened for
displaying even a hint of autonomy and confidence—traits that white boys his age
were encouraged by white society to embrace as manly virtues.
But there was a turning point in Douglass’s life, as Part III will summarize.
Never quite succumbing to the emasculating forces of slavery, an adolescent
Douglass was seen by his master as requiring intensive reform. The master therefore
sent the sixteen-year-old to a “slavebreaker” whose job was to destroy whatever
vestige of masculine self-assertiveness remained in Douglass. However, as will be
recounted in Part III, the slavebreaker’s violent methods backfired. Instead of
succumbing to the slavebreaker, the young Douglass fought with unforgettable
resolve for two hours against both the slavebreaker and his adult male cousin. The
resistance instilled in Douglass an incredible and everlasting sense of his manhood,
a gendered awareness that he was deserving the respect of others and that he
possessed the power to insist on such respect. It was this moment that, according to
the mature Douglass who had accomplished so much, imbued him profoundly with
the belief that he could battle racism.
An important means by which Douglass battled racism was by publishing
arguments that challenged Chief Justice Taney’s decision in Dred Scott. Part IV will
examine the substance of these arguments. Part IV will first review Douglass’s tenet
that the Constitution is an antislavery document. Douglass’s position was especially
striking because he justified it by reading the Constitution’s text alone, without
recourse to the methods of what scholars now call originalism. Douglass’s
interpretation of the Constitution therefore rejected the approach favored by Taney.
Taney had appealed to the authority of the Founding Fathers whom he characterized
as proud white supremacists who would never have entertained the possibility that a
defeated race of blacks should be admitted into the class of American citizens. In
lieu of the idiom of hypermasculinity that had been enlisted by Taney, Douglass
opted for textualism.
As Part IV will discuss, however, Douglass did not completely renounce
the idiom of manliness. Part IV will parse the famous speech by Douglass, “The
Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro,” delivered in 1852.35 The speech made
copious use of the symbolism of fathers and sons. Douglass reclaimed the image of
the Founding Fathers as Taney sketched them in Dred Scott. What made the

35. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro, in SELECTED SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS 188 (Phillip S. Foner & Yuval Taylor eds., 1999).
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Founding Fathers great, Douglass argued, was not their fealty to the hypermasculine
anthems of white supremacy. What made them great, he explained, was that they
aspired to be morally upright gentlemen who embraced the virtues of equal respect
and civility toward all, regardless of race. As Part IV will elaborate, Douglass
stressed that the Founding Fathers had failed to fulfill their own ethical aspirations,
but the white sons who were listening to him in 1852, could do so by working bravely
to end slavery and racism. Douglass thereby propounded a conception of manhood
that was compatible with an egalitarian interpretation of the Constitution.
I. DRED SCOTT AND RACIAL DOMINATION: WHITE SUPREMACY AS
HYPERMASCULINITY
There is no explicit mention of manhood or its related tropes anywhere in
the U.S. Constitution.36 More precisely, notwithstanding the enduring idea of the
Founding Fathers, there is no mention in the Constitution of patriarchy.37 The
omission is just as suggestive as its manifestation, however. For the omission
signified that the American colonists had rejected a form of government that was
founded on patriarchalism.38 This was no mean feat. For governments throughout
history had been founded on the premise that the king was the symbolic patriarch of
his nation.39 Britain was no different. Even though it was governed by a constitution,
its head was a monarch who presented himself as its patriarch and demanded
deference from his subjects.40
Against the tide of history, the American colonists fashioned a government
whose entire authority resided with the people themselves, not a patriarchal king.
The Constitution thus begins with the pronouncement that it is written in the people’s
name: “We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.”41 Frederick Douglass sought to
convince the public that the People mentioned in the Preamble were meant to include
blacks, whether enslaved or not.42 He was thereby arguing that blacks should be
treated as citizens, not as property.43 This task was more than an exercise in scholarly
exegesis; it was an act of political survival.44 By articulating his version of the
Constitution, Douglass intended to protect blacks from the terrors of white
supremacy.45 The substance of Douglass’s arguments will be examined in Part IV,
but it will suffice for now to note that his reading of the Constitution encountered a
grave obstacle. For some of the Constitution’s Framers were slaveholders, and far

36. That there is no mention of manhood in the Constitution does not necessarily mean, however,
that manhood and its related concepts are irrelevant to the Constitution. See generally John M. Kang,
Manliness and the Constitution, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 261 (2009).
37. Id. at 287–91, 325.
38. Id.
39. JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS 17 (1914).
40. Kang, Manliness and the Constitution, supra note 36, at 277–83.
41. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
42. See infra Part IV.
43. See infra Part IV.
44. See infra Part IV.
45. See infra Part IV.
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from subsuming their financial interest in slavery, they took pains to insert language
in the Constitution to protect it.
Indeed, there was textual evidence to support the view that the Constitution
was never intended to include blacks as citizens.46 For example, the only time that
blacks were directly mentioned by the Constitution was when they were referred to
as slaves. Article IV, Section 2, the so-called fugitive slave clause, guaranteed to
slaveholders that state governments, regardless of whether they permitted slavery,
were required to capture runaway slaves and return them to their owners.47 The
clause carried the implication that blacks were not entitled to be treated as persons,
let alone citizens, even after they had escaped their captors and had spent years living
on free soil. Other clauses in the Constitution also lent credence to the view that
blacks were excluded from the citizenry. Article I, Section 9 forbade Congress from
outlawing the importation of slaves until 1808.48 Article I, Section 2 contained the
“three-fifths clause” which recognized slaves as “persons,” but only for purposes of
federal taxation and congressional representation.49 It is easy to infer from such
examples that the Constitution was a document of white supremacy, not of racial
inclusivity, as Douglass claimed.
Such, at any rate, was the belief held by the United States Supreme Court
in the landmark case of Dred Scott v. Sandford.50 It was Dred Scott that established
the legal precedent that the Framers never intended for blacks to be treated as citizens
like their white counterparts.51 Before the Article dwells on the Court’s decision, the
facts of the case should be limned. In 1834, Dr. John Emerson had taken his slave
Dred Scott from Missouri, a slave state, to Illinois, a free one.52 While in Illinois,
Scott, with Emerson’s consent, married another slave and fathered two daughters.53
In 1838 Emerson took Scott and Scott’s family back to Missouri, and then sold them
to John Sanford (whose name was misspelled as “Sandford” by the court reporter).
At this point, Scott decided to sue Sanford. Scott argued that because he had
domiciled in Illinois he had become a citizen of that state, and therefore free.54 The
Supreme Court in 1857 declared that Scott lacked standing to sue as a citizen of
Illinois. According to the Court, Scott and his family were slaves who belonged to
Sanford.55
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney authored the Court’s opinion. He explained
that there were two places in the Constitution the Court should consult as to whether
Scott was a slave or a citizen: the Preamble and Article IV. The Preamble, it bears

46. See generally Paul Finkelman, How the Proslavery Constitution Led to the Civil War, 43
RUTGERS L.J. 405 (2013).
47. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
50. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). For discussion, see supra Part I.
51. See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 HOWARD L.J. 611, 653–55 (2006); Irving
Joyner, North Carolina’s Racial Politics: Dred Scott Rules from the Grave, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 141, 148–51 (2017).
52. 60 U.S. at 397.
53. Id. at 397–431.
54. Id. at 461–62.
55. Id. at 430.
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repeating, read: “We the People of the United States, . . . do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.” A consonant message of selfsovereignty was expressed by Article IV: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” For Taney, the
words “[P]eople of the United States” and “citizens” were “synonymous terms, and
mean[t] the same thing.”56 “They,” said Taney, “both describe the political body
who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold
the power and conduct the Government through their representatives.”57 Scott, Taney
decided, was not a citizen under Article IV nor a constituent part of We the People
alluded to in the Preamble. According to Taney, Scott was a slave, and would remain
so.
Among the arguments which he trundled, Taney’s most conspicuous claim
was that blacks could not qualify for citizenship because they were irredeemably
unmanly. If one reads Taney’s opinion, one will not find, though, direct mention of
manhood, along with its correlates of effeminacy and masculinity. But Taney’s
opinion is missing only the explicit terms; his opinion is rife with the themes of
submission and dominance, which these terms signify.58 Taney suggested that Scott
could not be regarded as a free man under the Constitution because his race had been
utterly dominated and degraded—in effect, unmanned—by Anglo-Saxons.59 As
vulgar as Taney’s rhetoric may have been, it resonated with much of his antebellum
white audience.60 For slavery did more than contort the legal identity of a man into
chattel; it also brutally emasculated him.61 Embedded in this relationship of unequal
power was a crude moral axiom: the strong (the manly) had the moral right to
dominate the weak (the unmanly). Taney aggressively conscripted this axiom as the
foundation of his jurisprudence in Dred Scott.62 Whites, he said, had earned the right
to dominate blacks because the former had dominated the latter; one race had proven
itself more masculine than the other.63
Read how Taney framed the legal issue—the central question to be decided
by the Court—one which he bluntly dubbed “simply this” in his judicial opinion.
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were
imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member
of the political community formed and brought into existence by
the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled
to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that
instrument to the citizen?64

56. Id. at 404.
57. Id.
58. See supra Part I.
59. See supra Part I.
60. See infra Part II.
61. See infra Part III.
62. See infra Part II.
63. See infra Part II.
64. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Not a model of pithiness, this. The paragraph is one indulgently cumbrous question.
It is a question in form only, however; substantively, it is a salvo of rhetoric. For
Taney’s question is a tendentiously laid first plank in an edifice of white supremacy
that he committed himself to building in his Dred Scott opinion.
What may have been a technical puzzle regarding federal jurisdiction was
reconfigured by Taney as a comparative study in contrasting narratives of
immigration. White and black, he wrote, began their American odyssey from
opposite ends of the political hierarchy. Scott, “a negro,” came from “ancestors
[who] were imported into this country, and sold as slaves.” Blacks did not choose to
come here as did the heroic Puritans who braved wind and water to create the fabled
City Upon a Hill for all the world to admire and emulate.65 White colonists kidnapped
blacks—or, as Taney, in a nod to courtroom etiquette, euphemized, “imported”
them—and forced them to serve and obey the latter. On the other hand, the white
colonists had consummated their identity through a manly act of collective self-will.
They had forged a “political community,” the first of its kind, “formed and brought
into existence by the Constitution of the United States.” In Taney’s imagination, the
Founding Fathers had heroically created a republic, but blacks were simply the
medium of labor by which the latter did so. As Taney said elsewhere in his legal
opinion, blacks were, at the Constitution’s adoption, “considered as a subordinate
and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race. . . . “66
Thus employed were the motifs of masculinity and emasculation in Dred Scott:
whites were a dominant race who had managed to overpower and enslave—or, in
Taney’s words, subjugate and subordinate, a weaker race of blacks. There was no
handwringing here. Taney did not contrive moralistic apologies for slavery as an
enlightened remedy to improve the downtrodden Negro. He crisply declared that
whites had conquered blacks. The manhood of whites had been vindicated, he
insisted, and the effeminacy of blacks, proved. No further justification need be
appended, Taney implied, for why blacks were never intended to be included among
“the People” or “the citizens” mentioned in the Constitution.
From this proudly remorseless platform Taney scaffolded his other
statements. Like this one: blacks “had for more than a century before been regarded
as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race.”67
By this, Taney meant that state laws almost never treated blacks as persons entitled
to political participation, treating them instead as “a class of beings” who had been
“stigmatized” and “upon whom [the states] had impressed such deep and enduring
marks of inferiority and degradation.”68 Inferiority and degradation need not be
confined in their meanings to linguistic approximations for effeminacy or as
antonyms for masculinity. Such was the way Taney used them, however. He steeped
“inferiority” and “degradation” in the gendered lexicon of power: blacks were
inferior and degraded because whites had dominated them. Blacks were said to be
65. “City Upon a Hill” refers to how John Winthrop, one of the leaders of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, described said colony. In A Model of Christian Charity, Winthrop urged his fellow colonists in
1630, “For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us.”
MICHAEL PARKER, JOHN WINTHROP: FOUNDING THE CITY UPON A HILL ix (2014).
66. Scott, 60 U.S. at 404–05.
67. Id. at 407.
68. Id. at 416.
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“a class of beings” who had been “stigmatized” and “upon whom [the states] had
impressed such deep and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation.”69 Blacks in
Taney’s imagination were inferior and degraded—not owing to alleged cultural
differences—but simply because they had been dominated by a stronger, more
masculine race. This historical record of white supremacy, Taney confidently
proclaimed, “show[ed] that a perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be
erected between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery, and
governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power. . . . “70
How could Taney immerse himself in such a glorification of racist
hypermasculinity in a nation that was founded on the principles of equality
articulated in the Declaration of Independence? Did not said principles evince the
Framers’ desire for a constitution in keeping with the virtues of tolerance and
civility? After all, the Declaration of Independence had famously held, “We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights. . . . “ Taney conceded that these
words “would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a
similar instrument at this day would be so understood.”71 However, “it is too clear
for dispute,” Taney asserted, “that the enslaved African race were not intended to be
included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this
declaration. . . . “72
Too clear for dispute. Taney’s conviction was unequivocal. However, his
arguments were inadequate. For even if such stout confidence were borne of fidelity
to the historical record, Taney would have failed to justify why his generation, about
seventy years removed from that of the Founders, should have to defer to what the
latter had believed. All he could muster was a gut argument. Taney knew (or said he
knew) that the Framers opposed freedom for blacks because, otherwise, the Framers
would debase themselves as dishonorable hypocrites, a conclusion Taney refused to
accept. “[I]nstead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently
appealed, they would have deserved and received universal rebuke and
reprobation.”73 We must not forget that “the men who framed this declaration were
great men . . . high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principles
inconsistent with those on which they were acting.”74 They were gentlemen of the
first rank, Taney vouched: trust them. For Taney, what elevated the Founders as
“great men” was that they had determined to honor without apology or
embarrassment the moralism of white supremacy. He suggested that integrity,
however poisoned it may have been by the vile project to which it had yoked itself,
was the primary virtue of significance for great men. In exegetical terms, Taney was
thus making a crude bid for what today’s scholars call originalism, the jurisprudential
method that looks to the intent of the Framers to determine the Constitution’s
meaning. He was arguing that from the perspective of originalism, the Framers

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
Id. at 410.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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seemed to have expressed a strong desire to design a constitution that would serve
the ends of white supremacy.
After establishing this claim, Taney circled back to where he started.
Namely, he returned to the premise that blacks were denied citizenship because they
were politically unmanned and hence socially unmanly. This logic of
hypermasculinity, Taney argued, precluded Dred Scott from being a citizen. The
Chief Justice thus sketched in coarse strokes a rudimentary theory of the Constitution
that, while muscular in its celebration of power, was ethically barbed in its
assumptions. For Taney had argued that only those who had enslaved others—only
those who had completely deprived others their freedom—were deemed worthy of
political freedom as citizens under the Constitution. Rather than denouncing
hypermasculinity, Taney embraced it as a prerequisite for political membership. The
hypermasculinity that Taney lauded was intrinsically social, a means to glue society
together, not to rend it apart. Hypermasculinity, as it was represented in Taney’s
opinion, discursively organized the identity of white colonists around the ideology
of racial supremacy. Taney’s judicial opinion helped whites to justify why they
should exclude blacks from the constitutional polity.
Taney was not alone in his judgments, and it was vital for him that he was
not. For without meaningful support from society at large, Taney’s judicial opinion
would not have found cultural purchase; it would have been derided as a work of
racist prejudice masquerading as a judicial opinion. Fortunately for Taney, other
votaries of slavery subscribed to his account of the black race as an unmanly race.
Some, like Taney, clung to the idiom of masculinity and domination, while others
opted for the overtly moral if insidious claim that the white slaveholder was an
indispensable savior to a contemptibly unmanly black race.
II. CULTURAL ARGUMENTS FOR SLAVERY: PROTECTING THE
FEEBLE BLACK
Chief Justice Taney was not alone in his contempt for blacks as an
emasculated race. In mid-nineteenth-century America, prominent defenders of
slavery subscribed to the belief that blacks were woefully unmanly. The
disparagement assumed political terms as blacks were alleged to be lacking the
qualities one would expect in independent citizens of a self-governing republic.75
Blacks were said to be dismally wanting in courage, self-respect, vigor, virility, and
a general desire to be their own person.76 This collective failing, moreover, was
alleged to be the product of biology, an uncomplicated case of nature, not nurture (or
in slavery’s case, exploitation).77 The case for slavery hinged therefore on the conceit
that while blacks had the anthropological attributes of mankind, they were sorely
destitute—and would always be destitute—the inexorably gendered virtue of
manhood. Slavery’s defenders accordingly maintained that detached from their white
masters, blacks would wallow in their degraded emasculation, and eventually perish.

75. RONALD TAKAKI, IRON CAGES: RACE AND CULTURE IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA 12–13, 29, 31,
47–49, 58, 64, 113, 138, 142, 207–08 (1990).
76. See infra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 83–107 and accompanying text.
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The Virginia sociologist George Fitzhugh, a renowned scholar in the South,
certainly thought, or at any rate, said so. Writing a few years before the Civil War,
he held forth that “from inferiority, or rather peculiarity, of race, almost all negroes
require masters, whilst only the children, the women, the very weak, poor, and
ignorant, &c., among the whites, need some protective and governing relation of this
kind. . . . “78 Fitzhugh groups black men with those conventionally regarded as the
most helpless and unmanly members of society—children, women, and the pitifully
weak. Fitzhugh thereby suggested that black men’s racial identity in effect erased
their gender identity; in his view, blackness preempted manhood. So unmanly was
the Negro that freedom, an emblem and entitlement of manhood, was anathema for
him: “[T]he negro has neither energy nor enterprise, and, even in our sparser
population, finds, with his improvident habits, that his liberty is a curse to
himself. . . . “79
Was not slavery, Fitzhugh inquired, a welcomed remedy? “[O]ur Southern
slavery has become a benign and protective institution, and our negroes are
confessedly better off than any free laboring population in the world.”80 Not only
were slaves in America able to subsist under slavery, their minds and morals,
Fitzhugh boasted, were improved by their masters.81 “In Virginia,” for instance, “the
slaves have advanced much in morality, religion, and intelligence, and their masters
and mistresses, living on the farm with them, naturally become attached to them.”82
The latter observation was meant to illustrate Fitzhugh’s belief that slavery as a social
institution functioned as a family. “[B]esides wife and children, brothers and sister,
dogs, horses, birds and flowers,” Fitzhugh dreamily rhapsodized, “slaves, also,
belong to the family circle.”83 Drawing from these blissful reconstructions, he could
say without irony that “[h]atred to slavery is very generally little more than hatred of
negroes.”84
Thomas Cobb also cheerfully maintained that blacks were properly
enslaved. And, like Fitzhugh, his were not the ramblings of an obscure crackpot.
Cobb was a member of the Confederate Congress and a founder of what would
become the University of Georgia Law School; he was the only Southerner to have
authored a legal treatise on slavery.85 Like Fitzhugh, he too trafficked in narratives
of black infantility. “The prominent defect in the mental organization of the negro,
is a want of judgment.”86 They were also innately lazy, he alleged—the “negro race
are [sic] habitually indolent and indisposed to exertion, whether seen in [Africa]” or

78. GEORGE FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL! OR SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 201 (C. Vann Woodward
ed., 1988).
79. Id. at 199.
80. Id. at 201.
81. Id. at 79.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 205.
84. Id. at 201.
85. DEFENDING SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH 143 (Paul Finkelman ed.,
2003).
86. 1 THOMAS READ ROOTES COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 35 (1858).
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“in the condition of slavery in America, or as free negroes after emancipation.”87
Blacks were also said to be devoid the manly instinct for physical reprisal against
those who had violently wronged them. They were, if anything, hopelessly loyal to
their masters. “The negro is not malicious.”88 “His disposition is to forgive injuries,
and to forget the past” and “[h]is gratitude is sometimes enduring, and his fidelity
often remarkable.”89 Harass the slave all you want, said Cobb; he had no manly fight:
“The dance will allay his most poignant grief, and a few days blot out the memory
of his most bitter bereavement.”90 In general, the black is “passive and obedient, and
consequently easily governed.”91
To this indifferently depraved (or willfully delusional) chorus of white
supremacy, additional observations about black submissiveness were ushered by
Samuel A. Cartwright, a noted New Orleans doctor in the 1850s. Cartwright, in the
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, reported in 1851 that blacks “resemble
children” because “they are very easily governed by love combined with fear, and
are ungovernable, vicious and rude under any form of government whatever, not
resting on love and fear as a basis.”92 “Like children,” wrote Cartwright, “they [need
not] be kept under the fear of the lash; it is sufficient that they be kept under the fear
of offending those who have authority over them.”93 And “[l]ike children, they are
constrained by unalterable physiological laws, to love those in authority over them,
who minister to their wants and immediate necessities.”94 Verily, Cartwright
continued, the “undoubted fact of the love [the Negroes] bear to their masters [is]
similar in all respects to the love that children bear to their parents, which nothing
but severity or cruelty in either case can alienate.”95
Given their physical ailments (a “defective hematosis,” whatever
Cartwright meant by that) and “the want of courage and energy of mind as a
consequence thereof,” the Negroes have “an instinctive feeling of dependence on
others, to direct them and to take care of them.”96 Cartwright elaborated, “Like
children, they require government in every thing; food, clothing, exercise, sleep—all
require to be prescribed by rule, or they will run into excesses.”97 It was therefore the
case that “the negro can no more help loving a kind master, than the child can help
loving her who gives it suck.”98 Cartwright, a physician, made ostentatious resort to
the authority of scientific jargon. He posited that “[i]n the anatomical conformation
of his knees,” the Negro suffered a condition called “genu flexit,” whereby he was
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“more flexed or bent, than any other kind of man.”99 Thus was proof that the Negro
was created by God as “the submissive knee bender” and that the white man’s efforts
to “raise him to a level with himself” was “to oppose the Deity’s will.”100 So there it
was, then: the unmanliness so often ascribed by slavery’s defenders to the black was
proved in his abjectly angled legs.
It was also evidenced in his cranium, the slaveholders insisted. The black,
they proclaimed, was mentally inferior to the white. A focus on such purported
inferiority might seem somewhat afield of the Article’s preoccupation with
emasculation. As a sociological phenomenon, however, the former can and has been
used to justify outcomes that implicate the latter. For at manhood’s core is a
nonnegotiable dictum—you must be your own man—but a woefully unintelligent
being, or one who lacks mature judgment requires a custodian.101 While such
guardianship can be appropriate, it also can render its subject unmanly by depriving
him of the requisite autonomy.102
The perception that a people, owing to some collective attribute, were
incapable of mature and independent deliberation was not only embarrassing, but, if
shared by many, downright damning in an American republic founded on selfgovernment. Before the American colonies had announced their independence from
Britain, the latter already had a constitutional democracy that was hundreds of years
old.103 However, America was the first republic to have established a constitutional
democracy in which all power derived from the people themselves, not from a
parliament, a monarch, or a group of nobles.104 Naturally, the Founding Fathers could
not help but wonder if their critics were right. Hamilton thus remarked in Federalist
1 that the experiment of constitutional democracy would show whether men “are
really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice,
or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on
accident and force.”105 Back in the mid-eighteenth century, in the new republic,
studied reflection about public affairs was elevated to a masculine virtue.106 And
given the precarious circumstances of the Revolution, said reflection could be an act
of heroism that had to be marshaled in defense of the fledgling nation and might
invite frightening retribution from the British.107
Thomas Jefferson, however, doubted that blacks could bestir such
reflection. The author of the democratic chant in the Declaration of Independence
that all men were created equal confided elsewhere that they were not. No doubt,
Chief Justice Taney would have glowed with satisfaction to note Jefferson’s remark
that “[i]n general, [the blacks’] existence appears to participate more of sensation
99. Id. at 165–66.
100. Id. at 166.
101. Kang, Manliness and the Constitution, supra note 36, at 276–83.
102. Id.
103. John M. Kang, Patriarchy and Constitutional Origins, in CONSTITUTIONS AND GENDER 501, 501
(Helen Irving ed. 2017) [hereinafter Kang, Patriarchy and Constitutional Origins].
104. Id. at 508.
105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,
2001) (emphasis added).
106. Kang, Manliness and the Constitution, supra note 36, at 318–26.
107. Id.
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than reflection.”108 Jefferson elaborated: “[I]t appears to me, that in memory they are
equal to the whites; in reason much inferior, as I think one could scarcely be found
capable of tracing and comprehending the investigations of Euclid; and that in
imagination they are dull, tasteless, and anomalous.”109 Other times, Jefferson said
that a black’s imagination “is wild and extravagant [and] escapes incessantly from
every restraint of reason [and] leaves a tract of thought as incoherent and eccentric,
as is the course of a meteor through the sky.”110 “[The Negro’s] subjects,” Jefferson
complained, “should often have led him to a process of sober reasoning: yet we find
him always substituting sentiment for demonstration.”111 And, please, Jefferson
objected, do not throw blame at slaveholders for the black’s vulgar shortcomings.
For Roman slaves, Jefferson hastened, were their society’s “rarest artists” and they
“excelled in science, insomuch as to be usually employed as tutors to their master’s
children.”112 But these were Roman slaves, mind you—they “were of the race of
whites”—and could count among them “Epictetus, Terence, and Phaedrus.”113 That
was why the Romans could afford to emancipate their slaves; the latter’s
interbreeding with free citizens would be benign if not salutary for both.114 “[W]ith
us,” though, the black slave was, if freed, “to be removed beyond the reach of
mixture.”115
Jefferson’s words were penned in 1782. But his was more than a relic of
bygone times. The ideology of white supremacy that organized them continued to
endure into the 1850s when Frederick Douglass was busily fighting for the cause of
abolition. Indeed, in 1857, Edmund Ruffin, the cantankerous Virginia state senator,
would not even go so far as to entertain the idea of freeing black slaves. Keep them
enslaved, he urged. Known for firing the first shot against Fort Sumter, Ruffin
acknowledged that “[t]he owner of negro slaves is interested in obtaining from them
the greatest amount of continued useful labor and service.”116 This interest, mind
you, was not raw greed, not quite, Ruffin wished the reader to know. For blacks
lacked the intelligence of mature men, and thus resembled infants, Ruffin defended;
without slavery’s paternal protections, how would they survive?117 Abolitionists had
promised repeatedly, Ruffin noted with impatience, that “with full opportunity and
facilities, and sufficient time for improvement, the negro could be raised to be equal
to the white man in mental acquirements—or, at least, to the capacity for selfgovernment, and self-support and preservation.”118 Ruffin dismissed such optimism

108. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in WRITINGS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, NOTES ON THE STATE OF
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114. Id. at 270.
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116. EDMUND RUFFIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY, OR, THE INSTITUTION CONSIDERED IN
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as absurd. In the North, public schools “are open to the children of the blacks as
freely as to the whites—many [blacks] have received collegiate education—and
nothing but the immutable decree of God, fixing on them mental inferiority, has
prevented high grades of intellect and of learning, being displayed in numerous
cases.”119
The sole occasion when blacks demonstrated authentic intelligence, Ruffin
was pleased to share, was when they sobered to the undeniable truth that they were
better suited for slavery under whites than for self-government with their black peers.
For Ruffin, then, the only time that blacks did something broaching manhood—
deliberation being an instance of independence, and thus manly—was, ironically,
when they manfully marched to the conclusion that they were not manly at all. Rather
than spitting in their oppressor’s eye, as genuine manhood would have prompted
them to do, the best blacks, in Ruffin’s account, meekly “acknowledged the
inferiority of their race.”120 “One of the results of this acknowledged inferiority,”
Ruffin pointed out, “is the well known general unwillingness of negroes to be
governed by men of their own race, compared to their usual submissive obedience
and docility to the government of white rulers.”121 Thus described, blacks were the
unmanly antithesis of the valiant Englishmen represented in the philosopher John
Locke’s boast, made in the seventeenth-century, that “[s]lavery is so vile and
miserable an Estate of Man, and so directly opposite to the generous Temper and
Courage of our Nation; that ‘tis hardly to be conceived, that an Englishman, much
less a Gentleman, should plead for’t.”122
According to Ruffin, Black slaves will
in most cases exhibit unwillingness to be commanded by the most
worthy and respectable of their fellows, even if allied to them by
ties of blood and friendship, and sometimes will proceed to
disobedience, and even mutinous conduct, when they would have
submissively obeyed and respected any white man as their
overseer, even if, in truth, less respectable as a man, and less
lenient and less intelligent in exercising the deputed authority of
the master.123
For Ruffin, blacks were wanting in nearly every regard save one: they appreciably
recognized their own inferiority such that they would worship at the feet of their
white masters than promote black leaders of their own choosing. Blacks, Ruffin
implied, did not aspire to the manly respect of democratic citizenship; they wanted
to be dominated. In lieu of manly resistance, they reputedly craved victimization.
Such arguments were presented in the forum of public opinion, not in a
court of law. They nonetheless served as the cultural ballast that was necessary for
Chief Justice Taney’s judicial opinion in Dred Scott to succeed. Edmund Ruffin,
George Fitzhugh, Samuel Cartwright, and Thomas Cobb had supplied what they
119. Id.
120. Id. at 16.
121. Id.
122. JOHN LOCKE, First Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 141, 141 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
123. RUFFIN, supra note 116, at 16–17.
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styled the evidence from sociology that helped to underwrite Taney’s judicial
pronouncements. Like the Chief Justice, these others had attempted to justify the
enslavement of blacks by harping on an ideology of hypermasculinity that celebrated
the domination of lesser races by whites. In such a context, Taney’s judicial opinion
not only seemed legitimate, but, in the grand narrative of history, almost inevitable.
It would be up to Frederick Douglass, a fugitive slave without any formal
education, to articulate a forceful critique of Taney and his ilk. The substance of
Douglass’s critique will be introduced in the next section. Thereafter, an explanation
rooted in a theory of manhood will be proffered for why Douglass may have felt
prompted to articulate his critique.
III. A CHALLENGE TO WHITE PATRIARCHALISM
The coterie of white supremacists who were discussed in the previous
section had reassured their fellow whites that the enslavement of blacks was none
too difficult. According to their explanations, the slavishness natural to the Negro’s
race had rendered him utterly dependent on white masters.
Against these robust accounts of black emasculation, Frederick Douglass
used his autobiography to supply a pointedly opposing narrative. Douglass’s
autobiography was no ordinary narrative. For his autobiography, one of the most
iconic in American history, contains a firsthand narrative of slavery that challenges
the descriptions of placid patriarchalism forwarded by slavery’s most prominent
advocates. The autobiography thus doubles as a political statement that prepares the
reader for Douglass’s formal arguments against slavery along with Douglass’s
formal arguments advocating why blacks were owed by whites equal citizenship. In
place of the helplessly docile Negro who was affectionately protected by his
patriarchal master, an article of propaganda advocated by Fitzhugh and others,
Douglass’s autobiography limned a picture of white masters who did their utmost to
control every aspect of a slave’s existence, lest the latter resist. Not familial love,
suggested Douglass, but an insatiable paranoia bordering on terror was the
organizing mood of the master. Douglass argued that masters were in fact wracked
with fear at the prospect that their slaves could murderously overthrow them at any
time and, in the interim, vengefully fantasized about doing so.
At the heart of the master’s campaign of oppression was the aim of
obliterating a slave’s sense of self-worth, a prerequisite for manhood.124 For, indeed,
you could not adhere to the manly virtue of being “independent in spirit”—or,
condensed to maxim, of being your own man—if you were coerced to forego
knowledge of yourself as a self-respecting being entitled to a measure of autonomy.
No wonder slaveholders endeavored to keep the slave in bleak ignorance of his
identity as a human being. Hence, Douglass confessed, “I have no accurate

124. Interested readers may consult other publications by the author relating to the topic of manliness.
The accounts of manliness offered in these publications are consonant with those being offered in this
Article. See, e.g., JOHN M. KANG, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND FIXATIONS OF MANLINESS (2018);
John M. Kang, The Burdens of Manliness, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 477 (2010); John M. Kang, Manliness
and the Constitution, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 261 (2009).
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knowledge of my age, never having seen any authentic record containing it.”125 Most
slaves, he rued, “know as little of their ages as horses know of theirs, and it is the
wish of most masters within my knowledge to keep their slaves thus ignorant.”126
Because even “white children could tell their ages,” Douglass was permanently
stunted in an ambiguous infantility.127 His master treated the slave’s questions about
his birth as evidence of “impudent curiosity,” the upshot of a surly impulse for one
who was “[b]orn for another’s benefit.”128
To reinforce Douglass’s ignorance, the law prohibited him from learning to
read. He did manage in snatches to glean shards of information from mischievously
kind white children in Baltimore.129 Even then, he was beset by a sense of futility.
“You will be free as soon as you are twenty-one,” he told his young companions,
“but I am a slave for life!”130 White children could outgrow their infantility, but
Douglass was forever condemned to it. Sophia, the wife of Douglass’s master, Hugh
Auld, also tried, for reasons that are obscure, to teach him to read.131 Whatever
Sophia’s motivations, Hugh sharply chastened her with this vulgar but illuminating
warning:
If you give a n****r an inch, he will take an ell. A n****r should
know nothing but to obey his master—to do as he is told to do.
Learning would spoil the best n****r in the world. Now . . . if you
teach that n****r [Douglass] how to read, there would be no
keeping him.132
Auld admonished his wife that if Douglass were armed with the knowledge of
reading, he would want to become his own man:
It would forever unfit him to be a slave. He would at once become
unmanageable, and of no value to his master. As to himself, it
could do him no good but a great deal of harm. It would make him
discontented and unhappy.133
Here was an unintended, but unequivocal, homage to the power of
knowledge to emancipate the slave. With the knowledge of reading, the slave would
“at once become unmanageable, and of no value to his master.” He may grow
“discontented” and “unhappy.” The feelings bespoke dissatisfaction, and the
dissatisfaction derived forms the slave’s newly acquired conclusion that he deserved

125. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, in AUTOBIOGRAPHIES,
supra note 2, at 15.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, My Bondage and My Freedom, in AUTOBIOGRAPHIES, supra note 2, at
147.
129. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, in AUTOBIOGRAPHIES,
supra note 2, at 39, 41.
130. Id. at 41.
131. Id. at 37.
132. Id. I have inserted asterisks in this passage and others, not to soften the racism expressed in the
excerpt, but to avoid unnecessarily offending readers.
133. Id.
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better. By being able to read, he became his master’s equal at the level of intellect.
Instead of deferring to his master, the slave felt that he could glean truth for
himself.134 After hearing Auld’s speech, Douglass “now understood what had been
to [him] a most perplexing difficulty—to wit, the white man’s power to enslave the
black man.”135 Auld, far from assuming that Douglass was mentally feeble, fretted
that he very much was not. In his remorselessly racist fashion, Auld was in effect
subverting the arguments on offer by the likes of Edmund Ruffin and George
Fitzhugh. Auld did not comfortably bask in the assumption that blacks were a
mentally docile race. Instead, he confessed his terror that they were not. The purpose
of slavery for Auld was not to accommodate a mentally dependent race, but to coerce
an independent-minded race to accept their lot as chattel.
The adolescent Douglass, while bereft a formal education, learned on his
own that slavery operated as a regime of coerced ignorance, and the master, far from
being confidently masculine, was absorbed with fear and perhaps gripped by the
effeminate vice of cowardice.
Even in its threadbare guises, the manhood of the slave was downright
criminal in his master’s eyes because it threatened the master’s legally unfettered
dominion of hypermasculine power. Notwithstanding the soothing reports of black
submissiveness furnished by Thomas Cobb, Esq. and Dr. Samuel Cartwright,
Douglass argued that any look, tone, or gesture by the slave suggestive of
independence of spirit would be punished as part of a campaign to induce an
entrenched infantilization.
Douglass offered these examples of culpable offenses by a slave.
Refusing to show cheerful servility:
“Does a slave look dissatisfied with his condition? It is said, that
he has the devil in him, and it must be whipped out.”136
Refusing to show solemn submissiveness:
“Does he forget, and omit to pull off his hat, when approaching a
white person? Then, he must, or may be, whipped for his bad
manners.”137
Expressing manly confidence:
“Does he answer loudly, when spoken to by his master, with an air
of self-consciousness? Then, must he be taken down a button-hole
lower, by the lash, well laid on.”138
Vindicating manly honor:
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“Does he ever venture to vindicate his conduct, when harshly and
unjustly accused? Then, he is guilty of impudence, one of the
greatest crimes in the social catalogue of southern society. To
allow a slave to escape punishment, who has impudently attempted
to exculpate himself from unjust charges, preferred against him by
some white person, is to be guilty of great dereliction of duty.”139
Outwardly, these examples might be read as solicitations for pity. Perhaps they were,
although one must be mindful of Douglass’s skeptical judgement that “[h]uman
nature is so constituted, that it cannot honor a helpless man, though it can pity him,
and even this it cannot do long if signs of power do not arise.”140
A more subversive and plausible reading is that Douglass was enlisting his
examples as indictments of contempt for white male insecurity and as evidence for
implicit recognition by whites for the black’s dormant manhood. If the white race
were magnificently masculine, as Chief Justice Taney, George Fitzhugh and others
had boasted, why would white masters be so prickly about the most innocuous signs
of black autonomy?
The depth of the slaveholder’s paranoia regarding his slave’s bid for
manhood was made clear by one last illustration that Douglass proffered, this one
involving not the insolent slave, but the solicitous. Suppose our slave struck the pose
of a sycophant. Next, suppose some marvelous idea had visited this slave, an idea
that would have effortlessly profited his owner. In anticipation of reward (or, perhaps
to project the consoling fantasy of merry collaboration), assume that the slave eagerly
confided said bright idea to his master. This would have been a very risky gesture,
Douglass feared. For while a slave who was smart could not help being so, if he
attempted to share that prodigious intelligence with his master, the slave would
chance to compare his mental powers to those of the latter, and that would serve
inadvertently as its own form of manly challenge. If the slave “ever venture to
suggest a better way of doing a thing, no matter what,” wrote Douglass, he is
considered “altogether, too officious—wise above what is written—and he deserves,
even if he does not get, a flogging for his presumption.”141 Douglass existed,
therefore, in a world where a slave’s manhood, however tempered, was made
illegal.142
The violence which the slaveholder frequently and fiercely inflicted on
Douglass in a ritual of the former’s hypermasculinity would nearly kill the latter. But
it was the same violence that, according to Douglass, would also awaken his nascent
manhood and embolden him to become, years later, the great abolitionist leader
whom we have come to know. It is thus worth dwelling on the details of this
transformation.

139. Id.
140. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, in AUTOBIOGRAPHIES, supra note
2, at 591.
141. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, My Bondage and My Freedom, in AUTOBIOGRAPHIES, supra note 2, at
295.
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The story begins with Douglass’s master marching him to a “slavebreaker”
named Edward Covey.143 As his rough moniker portended, Covey’s expertise was in
smashing the will of a slave, making him absolutely compliant to the claims of white
supremacy.144 The real business of slavery, therefore, did not rely on the putatively
compliant nature of the Negro, as someone like Thomas Cobb had casually
reassured, but on the vigilant practice of organized terror and socialized degradation.
Douglass would toil one year on Covey’s farm. Covey was about twentyeight years old, and Douglass, sixteen. The gap was not big in absolute numbers, but
measured by the quantum of manhood, it was cavernous.145 The slavebreaker
immediately went to work on the teenaged Douglass. Douglass drily quipped,
“Perhaps he thought that by coming to blows at once we should mutually better
understand our relations to each other.”146 “I had not been in his possession three
whole days before he subjected me to a most brutal chastisement.”147 “Under his
heavy blows,” remembered Douglass, “blood flowed freely, and wales were left on
my back as large as my little finger.”148 “The sores from this flogging continued for
weeks, for they were kept open by the rough and coarse cloth which I wore for
shirting.”149
During Douglass’s one-year stay with Covey, “I was whipped, either with
sticks or cow-skins, every week.”150 The weekly cycle of torture trapped the young
Douglass in a perverse life trajectory. As most white sixteen-year-old boys were
maturing into adulthood, and savoring its burgeoning pleasures of autonomy and
power, Douglass was being pummeled into relinquishing both—his was a regressive
infantilization. Under such circumstances, work, something that conventionally
instills freemen with manly self-esteem, operated as a grinding diurnal ritual meant
to erode Douglass’s dignity and will. Covey “worked me steadily up to the point of
my powers of endurance.”151 This entailed working in the field “[a]t certain seasons”
until “eleven and twelve o’clock at night.”152 “At these times,” Douglass noted,
“Covey would attend us in the field and urge us on with words or blows. . . . “153
One beating, in particular, harshly reinforced for the adolescent a poignant
lesson about his decrepit position in the world. Douglass had failed to tame a wild
ox as Covey had ordered him to do. It was a nearly impossible task for the teenager
who lacked the strength and, as an ordinary farm hand, the know-how; Douglass
failed to subdue the hulking beast who smashed a gate and an oxcart. As punishment,
Covey “w[ore] out on [Douglass’s] back the heavy goads which he had cut from the
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gum tree.”154 The sixteen-year-old Douglass gained a precociously despairing
insight: “I now saw, . . . several points of similarity with that of the oxen. They were
property, so was I; they were to be broken, so was I. Covey was to break me, I was
to break them; break and be broken—such is life.”155 The boy was being unmanned
in two respects. He was emasculated by being dominated by Covey, and, by being
broken like oxen, he was reduced to a beast, and hence treated as something outside
the family of man. Covey was in essence treating the adolescent Douglass with a
brutality that would have been completely agreeable to a Polyphemus towards an
Odysseus. Covey, moreover, was also gratifying the hypermasculine passions that
Locke had condemned as emblematic of the beasts like wolves and lions who prey
on humans.
After about six months, Douglass “broke down.”156 “[M]y strength failed
me; I was seized with a violent aching of the head, attended with extreme dizziness,
and trembling in every limb.”157 “I had by this time crawled away in the shade,”
Douglass narrated, “under the side of a post-and-rail fence, and was exceedingly
ill.”158 Covey spotted the idle Douglass.159 “He gave me a savage kick in the side
which jarred my whole frame, and commanded me to get up.”160 Douglass, after six
months of intimidation and abuse, had been so cowed by then that he would have
done anything to placate Covey: “The monster had obtained complete control over
me, and if he had commanded me to do any possible thing I should, in my then state
of mind, have endeavored to comply.”161 Yet he could not: “I made an effort to rise,
but fell back in the attempt before gaining my feet.”162 Covey “gave me another
heavy kick, and again told me to rise.”163 Douglass, again, could not, and that was
when Covey struck him, inflicting “a large gash, and caused the blood to run freely,
saying at the same time, ‘If you have got the headache I’ll cure you.’”164 Helpless to
rise, Douglass half hoped that Covey would kill him, which “might put me out of my
misery.”165 But Covey was paid to be a slavebreaker, not a slave killer; he left
Douglass alone to bleed.166
Douglass then lit upon a very perilous decision to return to Master Auld—
without Covey’s permission. Auld, young Douglass was well aware, cared nothing
for him as a person, but Douglass was going to appeal to his master’s base concern
for him as an expensive investment.167 Once at the house, Douglass warned Auld that
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Covey was destroying him—Auld’s property; would not Auld permit Douglass to
return home?
No, he would not. Auld furiously rejected Douglass’s request: “He did not
believe I was sick; I was only endeavoring to get rid of work. My dizziness was
laziness, and Covey did right to flog me as he had done. . . . [Auld] fiercely
demanded what I wished him to do in the case!”168 While emotionally crushed,
Douglass knew “I must not assert my innocence of the allegations he had piled up
against me, for that would be impudence.”169 “The guilt of a slave,” as a matter of
course, “was always and everywhere presumed, and the innocence of the
slaveholder, or employer, was always asserted.”170 That is, the issue for Auld was
not whether Douglass or any other slave was speaking truthfully. It was rather that
the slave had no right to speak, period: “‘Do you dare to contradict me, you rascal?’
was a final silencer of counter-statements from the lips of a slave.”171 The tyrannical
rebuke was of a piece with slavery’s mission to emasculate blacks.
Auld commanded Douglass to march back to Covey, and so he did.172 Back
at Covey’s farm, the slavebreaker awaited to give Douglass—just a sixteen-year-old,
remember—an unforgettable lesson about departing without permission; even by
slave standards, Douglass was in for the beating of a lifetime. “[Covey] was provided
with a cowskin and a rope, and he evidently intended to tie me up, and wreak his
vengeance on me to the fullest extent.”173 Afraid, Douglass darted into the woods. “I
was in the wood, buried in its somber gloom and hushed in its solemn silence; hidden
from all human eyes; shut in with nature and with nature’s God, and absent from all
human contrivances.”174 Here, thought Douglass, “was a good place to pray; to pray
for help, for deliverance—a prayer I had often before made.”175
In a mood befitting the theme of manhood, Douglass in this particular
moment of crisis in the woods of Maryland did not seek solace from God. Part of the
reason was that Douglass had never known divine assistance. Douglass’s view of
religion also had been soured by the fact that slaveholders were among the most
ostentatious and ardent Christians.176 Covey, for instance, was “a professor of
religion—a pious soul—a member and a class-leader in the Methodist church.”177
For Covey, “[a] long prayer at night made up for the short prayer in the morning; and
few men could seem more devotional than he, when he had nothing else to do.”178
So, secluded in the woods, Douglass wondered forlornly:
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[H]ow could I pray? Covey could pray—Capt. Auld [my master]
could pray. I would fain pray; but doubts arising, partly from my
neglect of the means of grace and partly from the sham religion
which everywhere prevailed, there was awakened in my mind a
distrust of all religion and the conviction that prayers were
unavailing and delusive.179
No divine patriarch to guard him, the teenaged Douglass confronted a glum reality.
“Life in itself had almost become burdensome to me,” he observed.180 “I must stay
here and starve, or go home to Covey’s and have my flesh torn to pieces and my
spirit humbled under his cruel lash. These were the alternatives before me.”181
Eventually, an empathic older slave named Sandy found Douglass and
persuaded the latter to come home with him. After feeding the boy, Sandy turned the
talk to the consolations of magic, not an unusual topic for slaves who had been denied
formal learning and subject to every variety of violation and anguish. Sandy assured
Douglass that Covey could not hurt him if Douglass carried a magical herbal root;
no white man, Sandy vouched, had ever laid a hand on him as long as he kept the
root.182 Gibberish, thought Douglass—”very absurd and ridiculous”—but who was
he, a semi-fugitive sixteen-year-old slave with nowhere to go, to question Sandy’s
wisdom? After mulling it over, and in the warm hearth of Sandy’s home, Douglass
could not help but believe that his companion was making “a powerful argument just
then.”183 Douglass took the root, and he reluctantly trudged back to Covey’s farm;
he braced himself for Covey’s pending fury.
An odd spectacle awaited him. Covey, dressed in his Sunday’s best, was
strolling with his wife to church, both “smiling as angels,” and neither, upon seeing
Douglass, flashed anything broaching a frown.184 Indeed, Douglass thought, “[t]here
was something really benignant in his countenance.”185 Perhaps the root’s magic was
working, Douglass ventured; Jesus, on this Sabbath day, was perhaps protecting him.
These surmises were fleeting, though: “I suspected, however, that the Sabbath, not
the root, was the real explanation of the change.”186 By “Sabbath,” Douglass was not
suggesting that Covey’s was an enactment of godly intervention. Rather, Covey’s
actions, Douglass guessed, stemmed from a twisted religious zealotry that was
obsessed with the pleasures of ceremony, not genuine faith. Covey’s “religion
hindered him from breaking the Sabbath, but not from breaking my skin on any other
day than Sunday.”187 Covey “would cut and slash my body during the week,” but
“he would on Sunday teach me the value of my soul, and the way of life and salvation
by Jesus Christ.”188 As practiced by Covey, the Sabbath betokened for Douglass not
salvation, but bumptious hypocrisy. Religion represented for the sixteen-year-old a
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creed that could be manipulated and made to service the justifications for evil.
Nonetheless, on that Sunday, Douglass, wracked with terror and exhaustion, profited
from a much-needed day of rest.
Things were wholly different on Monday. Covey “sneaked into the stable”
and “seiz[ed] me suddenly by the leg, he brought me to the stable-floor, giving my
newly-mended body a terrible jar.”189 The magic roots had failed Douglass; God
apparently had failed Douglass; and Christianity, in the repulsive form of Covey and
his wife, had revealed itself as farce. The sixteen-year-old Douglass realized he had
only himself. His unaided manhood would be tested. “I now forgot all about my
roots, and remembered my pledge to stand up in my own defense.”190
Covey tried to put a slip-knot on Douglass’s legs but “[h]e was defeated in
his plan of tying me.”191 “While down,” Covey “seemed to think that he had me very
securely in his power.”192 Covey “little thought he was—as the rowdies say—’in’ for
a ‘rough and tumble’ fight; but such was the fact.”193
What followed was the most important event in Douglass’s life: he found
his manhood.
Two hours. That is how long Douglass’s now storied brawl with Covey
lasted.194 The details of the ordeal will follow. What will be stressed is how the
narrative of the brawl was much more than an ordering of events. It was meant to
persuade a white readership that the black man was deserving of equal citizenship.
Specifically, the narrative was meant to illustrate in compelling terms the thesis that
the black man was both manly and gentlemanly. Douglass, through his account of
the fight that would change his racial worldview, sought to prove to white America
that he could muster a heroic violence to defend himself against a tyrant, but that he
would never breach the norms of the self-restraint characteristic of a gentleman who
cherished civility and its attendant ideals. By demonstrating that he could be both
simultaneously civil (like a gentleman) and assertive (like a warrior), Douglass thus
embodied and acted out, quite literally, the moral principles that were demanded by
the Constitution’s logic of self-government. In essence, Douglass’s summary of his
fight with Covey was made to do the work of politics. Douglass sought to enlist the
narrative, which had been polished over three different versions of his
autobiography, to demonstrate to a white audience that his identity as both man and
gentleman rendered him splendidly qualified for the privilege and responsibility of
equal citizenship. Such was the political backdrop for Douglass’s narrative of the
brawl.
Return to the action. Covey, Douglass told the reader, “little thought he
was—as the rowdies say—’in’ for a ‘rough and tumble’ fight; but such was the
fact.”195 An ominous forecast had been delivered by Douglass. While the hint of
violent resistance was palpable, Douglass was suggesting something more subtle in
this sentence. He was taking pains to accentuate that while he would immerse himself
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in violence, he was not a hypermasculine brute. Consider the insertion of the nested
quotation in the latter excerpt to enclose the phrase “rough and tumble.” These were
words that Douglass himself would not use, he wished his reader to know; it was the
vernacular of “the rowdies.”196 Rough and tumble was the chosen idiom of a vulgar,
coarser class of men who, as suggested by their very name rowdies, was given to
hypermasculine impulses. Therefore, even as Douglass sought to participate in a
“rough and tumble” fight, he clearly sought to distance himself from a culture of
hypermasculinity. He would fight to save himself, but fight as a gentleman, not as a
“rowdy.”
Part of the reason why he was able to do so was because Douglass, from the
beginning of the fight with Covey, was fully in charge. Right from the start, Douglass
wanted to reassure his reader that he “felt as supple as a cat, and was ready for
[Covey] at every turn.”197 Note the animal metaphor that Douglass chooses for
himself: a cat. Felines are conventionally associated with femininity; while cats do
look for prey in rodents and birds, they are not usually considered beasts of prey in
the vein of wolves and lions, frightening beasts that can prey on men. Wolves and
lions, indeed, can serve as symbols of hypermasculinity. Significantly, no blows
were delivered by Douglass. There is a dramatic moment, it is true, when Douglass
held Covey’s throat. Douglass “held [Covey] so firmly by the throat that his blood
followed my nails.”198 Even, here, though, Douglass did not enjoy any advantage.
“He held me, and I held him.”199 At this point “[a]ll was fair thus far, and the contest
was about equal.”200 By thus seizing Covey, Douglass, as a boy, saw his actions in a
larger political light. “I found my strong fingers firmly attached to the throat of the
tyrant, as heedless of the consequences, at the moment, as if we stood as equals
before the law.”201 “The very color of the man was forgotten,” he concluded.202
They were merely holding each other, but it was enough to terrify Covey,
who, in Douglass’s narrative, revealed himself a coward. The slavebreaker was
seized by the very terror that he had casually doled out to his adolescent captive:
“My resistance was entirely unexpected and Covey was taken all aback by it.”203
Covey, once menacing, now “trembled in every limb,” and lamely bayed at
Douglass, “Are you going to resist, you scoundrel?”204 At this point, the reader would
expect Douglass to repay Covey for his sadism or to at least to proffer a duly angry
retort that would have been received by Covey as unpardonably insolent. Douglass
did no such thing. Instead, he acted the perfect gentlemen, even including a respectful
honorific, a gesture bordering on the incredulous. “Yes sir,” Douglass retorted,
“steadily gazing my interrogator in the eye, to meet the first approach or dawning of
the blow which I expected my answer would call forth.”205
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No such blow arrived. In its stead came an admission of effeminate
helplessness. The 28-year-old slavebreaker screamed for assistance from his cousin.
“Covey soon cried lustily for help; not that I was obtaining any marked advantage
over him, or was injuring him, but because he was gaining none over me, and was
not able, single-handed, to conquer me.”206 Douglass carefully qualified that he was
not, in any way, threatening Covey’s life. Douglass was not “obtaining any marked
advantage over him” or “injuring him.” As far as Douglass was concerned, he was
fine with the deadlock. Covey, on the other hand, continued to adhere to the
psychology of a tyrant by trying to “conquer” Douglass. After Covey called for him,
Covey’s cousin Hughes darted to subdue Douglass.
Now it was two grown men conspiring against the lone youngster. Douglass
had been essentially on the defensive before Hughes showed up, but, outnumbered,
he had to take preemptive steps, or, rather, punches. Nevertheless, these were thrown,
he stressed, because he had no choice, not because he enjoyed the pleasures of
hypermasculinity. “I was compelled to give blows, as well as to parry them.”207
Suggestively, Douglass, at this point, does not align himself with the likes of a wolf
or lion. Instead, Douglass, even as he was fighting off Covey analogizes himself to
an animal that is the prey: “ . . . I felt (as the musty proverb goes) that I ‘might as
well be hanged for an old sheep as a lamb.’”208 The reference to being “hanged” was
not a hyperbole; slaves could be executed for physically assaulting their masters.
Even as Douglass was asserting himself valiantly against Covey, the slave was also
condemning himself to death. Douglass thereby cast himself as a potential victim,
not an aggressor. While just a boy, he was preparing himself to be a gentleman by
adopting the mindset of a helpless martyr, not a wolfish belligerent. Douglass
suspected that he would be hanged for his assault against Covey, but he refused to
give vent to any hypermasculine passions for fierce revenge. In Douglass’s telling,
he remained a gentleman who accorded himself as civilly as possible under the
circumstances. Douglass continues his story: “I was still defensive toward Covey,
but aggressive toward Hughes, on whom, at his first approach, I dealt a blow which
fairly sickened him.”209 Hughes “went off, bending over with pain, and manifesting
no disposition to come again within my reach,” but then tried “to catch my right
hand,. . . . “210 Douglass then “gave [Hughes] the kick which sent him staggering
away in pain, at the same time that I held Covey with a firm hand.”211 Again,
Douglass had no craving for hypermasculine revenge; his reactions were wholly
defensive. Even as he was besieged by two men, the boy behaved like a gentleman
who, to the extent possible, remained astonishingly civil.
Regardless, Covey was beat. “Taken completely by surprise, Covey seemed
to have lost his usual strength and coolness,” and he “was frightened, and stood
puffing and blowing, seemingly unable to command words or blows.”212 When
Covey “saw that Hughes was standing half bent with pain, his courage quite gone,
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 588–89.
Id. at 589.
Id.
Id.
Id.

370

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

the cowardly tyrant asked if I ‘meant to persist in my resistance.’”213 Douglass very
much did: “I told him I ‘did mean to resist, come what might; that I had been treated
like a brute during the last six months, and that I should stand it no longer.’”214 I
should stand it no longer. Douglass’s declaration was a portent of manly violence,
but it did not share the dangerous passions of a culture of hypermasculinity.
Douglass, after all, did not wish to hurt Covey; the former only wished to “resist.”
This was not the indulgence of a hypermasculine brute who, like the philosopher
John Locke’s Beast of Prey, knew “no other Rule, but that of Force and Violence.”
Indeed, it was the sentiment of one who sought to justify his actions before Covey,
his oppressor, a being who, unlike Douglass, was a veritable personification of
Locke’s Beast of Prey. Further, with the words I should stand it no longer, Douglass
was warning his slavebreaker that the young slave would give the former one final
chance to desist.
Arriving like a necessary intervention in a narrative of drama, Covey,
almost as if taking stage direction from Douglass himself, unwisely bent to grab a
stick to hit the latter. It was the perfect provocation. For it afforded Douglass the
opportunity to fulfill through action what he meant by the ominous promise I should
stand it no longer. In pledging that he would no longer stand it, Douglass was in
effect challenging the argument by Samuel Cartwright that the Negro was “the
submissive knee bender.” When attacked by Covey with the stick, “I seized him with
both hands by the collar,” Douglass stated, “and with a vigorous and sudden snatch
brought my assailant harmlessly, his full length, on the not over-clean ground, for
we were now in the cow-yard.”215
Douglass wanted to stress, yet again, that he was a gentleman. Yes, he was
“vigorous” but his actions towards Covey were “harmless.” Nevertheless, their
symbolic import was undeniable. The narrative of Covey being thrown into the
“cow-yard” represented how a racist hierarchy built on ruthless exploitation was
turned on its head, literally. Douglass, a slave relegated by law and social practice to
the very bottom of society, physically toppled Covey, our herald of white supremacy;
Douglass threw him into the “not over-clean ground,” into the “cow-yard.” The
takedown succinctly symbolized Douglass’s transformation from boy to man. The
sixteen-year-old had inverted the received axioms of social reality: he won his
(teenaged) manhood by defeating two grown white men, including a notorious
slavebreaker. He demonstrated to himself and them that he was not the emasculated
figure of contempt supposed by slavery’s defenders.
Douglass thus mused, decades later, in the third iteration of his
autobiography that “[t]his battle with Mr. Covey, . . . was the turning-point in my
‘life as a slave.’”216 The battle, he declared with satisfaction and some wonder,
“revived a sense of my own manhood”, and “I was a changed being after that
fight.”217 The extent to which the brawl altered him was made unequivocal by
Douglass in these lines: “I was nothing before; I was a man now. [My physical
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victory over Covey] recalled to life my crushed self-respect, and my self-confidence,
and inspired me with a renewed determination to be a free man.”218 Here was a direct
refutation of the arguments presented by slavery’s proponents, including by Thomas
Cobb, who had reassured his white readers that the Negro was “passive and obedient,
and consequently easily governed.”219
It was paramount, however, that Douglass convince his white audience that
the sum of his manhood amounted to a propensity for violence. To that end, it is
important to note how the celebration of violence in Douglass’s narrative, while
evident, is also studiously tempered by his desire to be thought of as a gentleman
who values civility. One therefore does not find any boasting on Douglass’s part for
having defeated a sadistic tyrant. The brawl, despite its unequivocal success for
Douglass, did not instill in him a taste for bloodlust. Rather, the experience of having
beaten two grown men in a fight for his life, an otherwise glorious achievement of
masculinity, engendered in young Douglass an effect which was morally
ameliorative. It “inspired” him to pursue “a renewed determination to be a free man.”
The event thus emboldened him to assert his right to be treated with dignity, a crucial
lesson for one who would become the most important abolitionist in America.
To be sure, Douglass’s glee in recounting his victory over Covey was plain,
and he took relish in sharing its details with the reader. Most notably, Douglass
eagerly shared with the reader a moment of poignant humiliation suffered by Covey.
“I seized him with both hands by the collar,” Douglass wrote, “and with a vigorous
and sudden snatch brought my assailant harmlessly, his full length, on the not overclean ground, for we were now in the cow-yard.”220 Douglass took pleasure in telling
the reader that a mere lad of sixteen had thrown the monstrous Covey into cow dung.
Even here, though, Douglass wants his reader to know that he behaved as a
gentleman. Douglass brought Covey down “harmlessly,” and no express gloating
attended the description.
For reasons that remain somewhat mysterious, Covey never reported
Douglass’s assault to the police. Douglass thus managed to avoid what would surely
have been a capital crime. One reason why Covey remained silent may have been
owing to the fact that he would have imperiled his profession as a slavebreaker if the
scandalous news had spread that it was he, not Douglass, who had been in a sense
“broken” by the black adolescent. Regardless, the fight with Covey was a comingof-age moment for Douglass. It taught him to be manly, but, also, gentlemanly.
Douglass, as an adult, would deliberate this event many times, and it would sustain
him in moments of doubt and embolden him to become the magnificent leader that
he became.
But the victory over Covey, standing alone, did not resolve whether
Douglass interpreted the Constitution as including blacks as citizens. But he would
offer a forceful answer, when he grew into his adulthood, decades removed from his
fight with Covey.
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IV. THE CONSTITUTION IS AN ANTISLAVERY DOCUMENT
Chief Justice Taney had decided in 1857 that blacks were never intended
by the Founding Fathers to be included as citizens in the Constitution. The reader
will recall that Taney had employed a version of originalism that went beyond a
professional interest in discerning the meaning of the Constitution’s text. Taney’s
originalism had allied itself to the political mission of glorifying the
hypermasculinity of the Anglo-Saxon race. Taney’s judicial opinion thus functioned
not simply as a document of exegesis but a celebration of white supremacy. He had
argued in Dred Scott that the white race had arrived on the shores of America as
heroic founders of a great republic. By contrast, blacks had arrived on the same
shores as a conquered race of slaves, Taney had stated. The white race, Taney had
explained, had proven their worth as citizens whereas the black race had failed
abjectly to do so. Therefore, insisted Taney, the Founding Fathers would never have
acquiesced the proposal that the Constitution meant to include blacks as citizens. To
suggest otherwise, according to Taney, would be tantamount to an implicit
acknowledgement that the Founding Fathers were magnificent hypocrites who
enslaved blacks, on the one hand, and saw them as citizens, on the other. This, Taney
refused to do.
If Frederick Douglass wished to argue that the Constitution did in fact
include blacks as citizens, he would need to respond to what Taney had written.
Douglass’s first order of business was to discredit Taney’s particular reliance on
originalism. He announced, “What will the people of America a hundred years hence
care about the intentions of the scriveners who wrote the Constitution?”221 After all,
Douglass explained, “These men are already gone from us. . . . “222 The
Constitution’s framers “were for a generation, but the Constitution is for ages.”223
Douglass added:
Whatever we may owe to them, we certainly owe it to ourselves,
and to mankind, and to God, to maintain the truth of our own
language, and to allow no villainy, not even the villainy of holding
men as slaves . . . to shelter itself under a fair-seeming and virtuous
language.224
The passage is suggestive. Douglass stated that the Constitution has a meaning
independent of what the Framers believed. He also declared that the people
themselves—his contemporaries—owed it to themselves to get the Constitution’s
meaning right.
What Douglass proposed as an alternative to originalism was a form of
textualism that was animated by an ethos of racial egalitarianism. He articulated his
ideas in a speech delivered in Scotland in 1860, three years after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dred Scott and eight years after his alternative account of the Constitution
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as an antislavery document.225 The speech was appropriately titled “The Constitution
of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery Or Antislavery?”226 For Douglass, the answer
was unequivocal: the great document was antislavery.227 Douglass began his
explication by emphasizing the importance of reading the text of the Constitution,
rather than deferring to the intent of the Founding Fathers. “What, then, is the
Constitution?” he posed.228 It was not the property of the Founding Fathers, he
suggested. Douglass elaborated that the Constitution “is a great national enactment
done by the people, and can only be altered, amended, or added to by the people.”229
For good measure, he added a statement that seemed a nearly direct rebuke of
Taney’s originalism: “It would be the wildest of absurdities, and lead to endless
confusion and mischiefs, if, instead of looking to the written paper itself, for its
meaning, it were attempted to make us search it out, in the secret motives, and
dishonest intentions, of some of the men who took part in writing it.”230
Having dissuaded the reader from consulting the intent of the Framers,
Douglass then urged the reader to consult the text of the Constitution itself. The
reader would then find a meaning that transcended the racist practices of some of the
Founding Fathers, reassured Douglass. Douglass began by examining Article I,
Section 9, Clause 1. This was the clause that seemed to guarantee to slaveholders the
right to traffic in human beings until 1808. The clause read:
The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by
the Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be
imposed on such importations, not exceeding 10 dollars for each
person.231
There were those who believed that this clause was evidence of the Constitution’s
support for slavery.232 For the clause appeared to them to “provid[e] for the
continuance of the African slave trade for 20 years, after the adoption of the
Constitution.”233 But Douglass criticized this interpretation as wrongheaded. He
urged:
It should be remembered that this very provision, if made to refer
to the African slave trade at all, makes the Constitution antislavery rather than for slavery, for it says to the slave States, the
price you will have to pay for coming into the American Union is,
225. Id. at 380.
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that the slave trade, which you would carry on indefinitely out of
the Union, shall be put an end to in twenty years if you come into
the Union.234
More to the point, the clause “looked to the abolition of slavery rather than to its
perpetuity.”235 This, of course, was not the interpretation adopted by Taney in Dred
Scott.
Nor was Douglass’s interpretation of the infamous “three-fifths
compromise” in Article I, Section 2, Clause 3.236 There too, one finds mention of
slavery, as signified by the reference to “all other persons”:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according
to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding
the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service
for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of
all other persons.237
Douglass stated in a surprising move that even if the clause were given the “very
worst construction,” such construction would amount to “a downright disability laid
upon the slaveholding States; one which deprives those States of two-fifths of their
natural basis of representation.”238 Therefore, Douglass explained, “instead of
encouraging slavery, the Constitution encourages freedom by giving an increase of
‘two-fifths’ of political power to free over slave States.”239 For Douglass, the threefifths clause “leans to freedom, not to slavery.”240 After all, he suggested, “for, be it
remembered that the Constitution nowhere forbids a coloured man to vote.”241
Douglass’s reading thus turned the three-fifths clause on its head, as a kind of
aspiration for racial equality.
Such imaginative interpretation was extended to the so-called “fugitive
slave clause” in Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2.242 The clause read:
A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime,
who shall flee justice, and be found in another state, shall, on
demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled,
be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of
the crime.243
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Douglass argued that the aforementioned clause “applies to indentured apprentices
and others who had become bound for a consideration, under contract duly made, to
serve and labour.”244 “To such persons,” he stressed, “this provision applies, and only
to such persons.”245 What Douglass meant by this was that the clause only applies to
those “bound to service.”246 He elaborated, “Its object plainly is, to secure the
fulfillment of contracts for ‘service and labour.’”247 As far as Douglass was
concerned, the clause only applies to “indentured apprentices, and any other persons
from whom service and labour may be due.”248 Therefore, “[t]he legal condition of
the slave puts him beyond the operation of this provision.”249 The slave, argued
Douglass, “is a simple article of property” and “does not owe and cannot owe
service.”250 The slave “cannot even make a contract.”251 The slave, in other words,
“can no more make such a contract than a horse or an ox can make one.”252 The slave
is accordingly “exempted from the operation of this fugitive provision.”253
The basis for Douglass’s interpretation rested on the belief that the
Constitution, being a written document, invited the people to discern its meaning for
themselves. “It is no vague, indefinite, floating, unsubstantiated, ideal something,
coloured according to any man’s fancy, now a weasel, now a whale, and now
nothing.”254 For Douglass, the Constitution “is a plainly written document, not in
Hebrew or Greek, but in English . . . .”255 With this remark, Douglass thereby made
the tacit suggestion that institutional authorities like Chief Justice Taney did not
enjoy greater epistemic authority than the average lay reader. The effect of
Douglass’s argument was to discredit Taney’s reliance on originalism and his
celebration of the Founding Fathers.
By opting for literalism and by rebuking originalism, Douglass would seem
to have rejected the Founding Fathers as a source of interpretive authority, and, by
extension, the manhood associated with them, as a source of morality. Such inference
would be unwarranted, however. For Douglass elsewhere had developed a robust
account of how the Founding Fathers should in fact be admired, albeit with critical
reflection, as moral authorities for successive generations. Douglass’s argument took
the form of a speech that he gave on July 5, 1852. That speech would be remembered
by future generations as his most famous. The speech was titled “The Meaning of
July Fourth for the Negro,” and it was delivered before a mostly receptive crowd of

244. DOUGLASS, The Constitution of the United States, in SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra
note 35, at 386.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 381.
255. Id.

376

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

white abolitionists in Rochester, New York.256 The substance of Douglass’s speech
differed from what he would say eight years later regarding the Constitution as an
antislavery document. For in the latter, Douglass seemed to have adopted the position
that the Founding Fathers were extraneous to the aims of uncovering the meaning of
the Constitution. However, in his earlier speech in Rochester, Douglass appeared to
have embraced the view that the Founding Fathers were worthy of emulation. The
title of Douglass’s Rochester speech, “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro,”
implied that his topic of choice was not manhood, but race; the speech, in fact, was
very much about race. Yet a conspicuous trope that organized his ruminations about
race and slavery was gender. In particular, Douglass dwelled on the crucial
relationship between sons and fathers, and its implications for political freedom and
justice.
In “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro,” Douglass started by
touching upon the political significance of the Fourth of July. “It is the birthday of
your National Independence, and of your political freedom,” he declared.257 This
much was obvious to the audience, of course. But in his speech, Douglass attributed
new meaning to the familiar terms “National Independence” and “political freedom.”
He used these terms to signify something more than occasions for collective selfcongratulation by white colonists. Specifically, Douglass desired for his white
audience to reflect on the uncomfortable question of what the Fourth of July meant
as a moral matter for “the Negro.” Douglass sought to prompt such reflection by
calling upon the white audience to recall the Fourth of July as a day of deliverance.
This special day, Douglass announced, “carries your minds back to the day, and to
the act of your great deliverance; and to the sign, and to the wonders, associated with
that act, and that day.”258 Douglass uses the word “deliverance” in a manner that was
meant to recall the Old Testament story of Moses. In fact, Douglass makes the
connection explicit. The Fourth of July, he declared, “is what the Passover was to
the emancipated people of God.” God had delivered Moses and the Jews from
Pharaoh’s enslavement, but, who, according to Douglass, had delivered the
American colonies from British tyranny?
Douglass was ready with an answer: the fathers of the men who were
listening to his speech. He thus introduced the thesis that the “National
Independence” and the “political freedom” solemnized by the Fourth of July were a
patrimony, a gift from fathers to their sons. The Fourth of July was, according to
Douglass, a day for sons to honor the fathers who risked life and limb to give the
former an extraordinary patrimony. Yet if Douglass’s account was true, the idea of
National Independence and political freedom also raised questions about
patriarchalism, the belief that fathers, rather than sons, deserved to rule, along with
the corollary belief that sons should defer to the epistemic authority of fathers.259
After all, if the fathers were capable of doing something that was comparable to what
God had done for Moses, should not the sons pledge their unqualified obedience to
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such heroic fathers in much the same vein that Moses and the Jews had done for God
with respect to His Ten Commandments?
As far as Douglass was concerned, the analogy was fundamentally flawed.
For the fathers of the men listening to him in 1852 had established a precedent of
refusing to honor political patriarchs. Indeed, these fathers had refused to abide the
British king, a being who styled himself a patriarch to the colonists. “Your fathers,”
Douglass told the audience, “esteemed the English Government as the home
government; and England as the fatherland.” Britain, like a father toward his infant
son, controlled the colonists, Douglass said.
This home government, you know, although a considerable
distance from your home, did, in the exercise of its parental
prerogatives, impose upon its colonial children, such restraints,
burdens and limitations, as, in its mature judgment, it deemed
wise, right and proper.260
While Britain may have thought its policy toward the colonists “wise, right and
proper,” the suggestion that Britain was the father to the colonists was also a
precarious one to embrace for the latter. For the fathers of the men who were listening
to Douglass were not infants; they were grown men. As grown men, they as a group
presumptively possessed the powers of reason and mature judgment. But the king,
without consultation from these grown men, had imposed the “restraints, burdens
and limitations” befitting children. There was, then, a glaring difference between the
British king and the God of the Old Testament. God had liberated the Jews; the
British king had infantilized the colonists.
As much as they may have “esteemed” the “fatherland,” the colonists
themselves were fathers, and they would not abide such infantilization from Britain.
As adult men who wished to think for themselves, the fathers of the men listening to
Douglass’s speech rebuked as unjust the king’s actions. “[Y]our fathers, who had not
adopted the fashionable idea of this day, of the infallibility of government, and the
absolute character of its acts, presumed to differ from the home government in
respect to the wisdom and the justice of some of those burdens and restraints.”261
Your fathers, Douglass reminded, “went so far in their excitement as to pronounce
the measures of government unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive, and altogether
such as ought not to be quietly submitted to.”262
This was no easy feat. For “there was a time when, to pronounce against
England, and in favor of the cause of the colonies, tried men’s souls.” 263 Douglass
elaborated, “To say now that America was right, and England wrong, is exceedingly
easy.”264 However, “there was a time when, to pronounce against England, and in
favor of the cause of the colonies, tried men’s souls.”265 For “[t]o side with the right
against the wrong, with the weak against the strong, and with the oppressed against
260. DOUGLASS, The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro, in SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS,
supra note 35, at 190.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.

378

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

the oppressor! here lies the merit, and the one which, of all others, seems
unfashionable in our day.”266 The fathers who hastened the momentous events of the
Revolution were undaunted, Douglass told his audience. “Feeling themselves
harshly and unjustly treated, by the home government, your fathers, like men of
honesty, and men of spirit, earnestly sought redress.”267 But, Douglass stressed, they
did so with the civility becoming of gentlemen. “They petitioned and remonstrated:
they did so in a decorous, respectful, and loyal manner.”268 This was an important
detail because it suggested that colonial men were mature and self-disciplined, not
the purported children whom Britain assumed they were.
Sensing that legal measures were ineffective, the fathers sought more
assertive means. “Oppression makes a wise man mad,” Douglass foreboded.269
“Your fathers were wise men, and if they did not go mad, they became restive under
this treatment.”270 The fathers “felt themselves the victims of grievous wrongs,
wholly incurable in their colonial capacity.”271 Yet “[w]ith brave men there is always
a remedy for oppression.”272 “Just here,” Douglas exclaimed, “the idea of a total
separation of the colonies from the crown was born!”273 It was an idea that terrified
lesser men. “The timid and the prudent (as has been intimated) of that day were, of
course, shocked and alarmed by it.”274 With these words, Douglass provided a tacit
response to the question of what was the relationship between patrimony and
patriarchalism in the context of “National Independence” and “political freedom.”
He in effect suggested that the patrimony bequeathed by American fathers toward
their sons were the gifts of National Independence and political freedom, gifts that
were wrought by overthrowing an authoritarian patriarchalism as a bane to selfgovernment. In essence, the patrimony given by the fathers to their sons was the
overthrowing of patriarchalism as a formal basis for political authority in the
colonies.
Yet the Fourth of July was not an unqualified gift for the sons. It also
represented a burden for them, one that Douglass urged they should willingly bear.
For, in Douglass’s mind, the Fourth of July was more than an event. It was the
enactment of an aspiration to establish a republic founded on political freedom. The
best way for the sons to honor their fathers, Douglass argued, was by furthering their
aspirations for political freedom by eradicating slavery and giving legal rights to
blacks.
How Douglass intended to distill these arguments from the theme of the
Fourth of July required time and was made gradually. He started by paying what
appeared to be standard homage to the heroism of the republic’s fathers. This was a
somewhat paradoxical move for one who had disclaimed patriarchalism in its
authoritarian guise. It was necessary, however, because Douglass needed to establish
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that the republic’s fathers were paragons of moral manliness who deserved to be
emulated by the sons. “Fellow Citizens,” he announced, “I am not wanting in respect
for the fathers of this republic.”275 Far from it, reassured Douglass. “The signers of
the Declaration of Independence were brave men,” he said. “They were great men,
too—great enough to give frame to a great age.”276 Moreover, Douglass added, “It
does not often happen to a nation to raise, at one time, such a number of truly great
men.”277 What rendered them “truly great men” was not simply that they had
procured America’s independence from Britain. In Douglass’s telling, the fathers of
the Founding Generation almost took on the cast of romantic dreamers who were
willing to die for freedom as its own end. “Your fathers staked their lives, their
fortunes, and their sacred honor, on the cause of their country.”278 Douglass
continued, “In their admiration of liberty, they lost sight of all other interests.”279
Elaboration followed:
With them, nothing was “settled” that was not right. With them,
justice, liberty, and humanity were “final”; not slavery and
oppression. You may well cherish the memory of such men. They
were great in their day and generation. Their solid manhood stands
out the more as we contrast it with these degenerate times.280
Consider what Douglass was saying. The sons lived in “degenerate times,”
a shameful transgression from the paradigm of “solid manhood” created by their
fathers. The fathers’ glorious manhood was founded on the moral commitment to the
principle of freedom. According to Douglass, the fathers of the republic were
opposed to “slavery and oppression.” To be sure, the terms “slavery” and
“oppression,” as Douglass used them, were not meant to describe the enslavement
of blacks or their oppression. Douglass was referring to the “slavery and oppression,”
such as they were, that the white fathers suffered at the hands of Britain.
Nevertheless, the parallels that he was trying to draw from the political
“slavery” imposed on the white colonists to the totalitarian slavery suffered by blacks
were plain. Douglass was implying that white fathers had created for their sons the
moral precedent of embracing freedom and fighting oppression. The fathers had
pledged their lives to honor “eternal principles” about freedom. It was the sort of
heroic selflessness that white politicians in Douglass’s own time would not make, he
rued.
How circumspect, exact and proportionate were all their
movements! How unlike the politicians of an hour! Their
statesmanship looked beyond the passing moment, and stretched
away in strength into the distant future. They seized upon eternal
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principles, and set a glorious example in their defence. Mark
them!281
According to Douglass, it was chiefly a nonnegotiable yearning for freedom itself,
rather than monetary gain or even a desire to repel cruelty, that motivated the fathers
of the republic to overthrow British tyranny.
The exquisite moral example set by these heroic fathers was not a luxury to
be savored by the sons, Douglass admonished. It was a call for the sons to fulfill the
moral duty to live up to their father’s aspirations. “Your fathers have lived, died, and
have done their work, and have done much of it well.”282 Now the obligation fell to
the sons:
You have no right to enjoy a child’s share in the labor of your
fathers, unless your children are to be blest by your labors. You
have no right to wear out and waste the hard-earned fame of your
fathers to cover your indolence.283
If political freedom was a patrimony, it was one that came with grave expectations
for the sons to extend in their own time and render robust its substance.
It was fashionable, hundreds of years ago, for the children of Jacob
to boast, we have “Abraham to our father,” when they had long
lost Abraham’s faith and spirit. That people contended themselves
under the shadow of Abraham’s great name, while they repudiated
the deeds which made his name great. Need I remind you that a
similar thing is being done all over this country to-day?284
What was this “similar thing” that Douglass referred to? The mention of
Abraham and Jacob, signal characters in the narrative of the Old Testament, should
have alerted the reader. Douglass explained:
Need I tell you that the Jews are not the only people who built the
tombs of the prophets, and garnished the sepulchers of the
righteous? [George] Washington could not die till he had broken
the chains of his slaves. Yet his monument is built up by the price
of human blood, and the traders in the bodies and souls of men
shout—”We have Washington to our father.”—Alas! that it
should be so; yet so it is.285
Note how Douglass humanizes the immortal Washington. Instead of paying
uncritical homage to the great man, Douglass portrays the Founding Father as both
moral gentleman and hypermasculine brute. Washington “could not die till he had
broken the chains of his slaves.” He was therefore a splendid gentleman. Yet
Washington also left behind a legacy of racial exploitation that was built on “human
blood.” By thus casting Washington—the Father of His Country—as both a splendid
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gentleman and a brute, Douglass was preparing his audience for the proposition that
both they and their fathers occupied the same morally barbed position. Both the
fathers and sons acknowledged the priority of freedom, but both also benefited from
the tyrannical practice of slavery. As such, the fathers and the sons showed
themselves as hypocrites. Both the fathers and sons therefore suffered the moral vice
that Chief Justice Taney staunchly refused to attribute to the Founding Fathers. Not
only were the Founding Fathers like Washington hypocrites, Douglass argued, so too
were all of the white fathers and all of the white sons who, like gentlemen,
championed the cause of freedom on the one hand but, like tyrants, benefited from
slavery on the other.
Douglass made his thesis explicit, and, in doing so, he finally clarified the
central thesis of his speech, “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro.”
What, to the American slave, is your 4th of July? I answer; a day
that reveals to him, more than all other days in the year, the gross
injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim. To him,
your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty, an unholy license;
your national greatness, swelling vanity; your sounds of rejoicing
are empty and heartless; your denunciation of tyrants, brass
fronted impudence. . . . 286
The condemnation reached a crescendo.
[Y]our shouts of liberty and equality, hollow mockery; your
prayers and hymns, your sermons and thanksgivings, with all your
religious parade and solemnity, are, to [God], mere bombast,
fraud, deception, impiety, and hypocrisy—a thin veil to cover up
crimes which would disgrace a nation of savages. There is not a
nation on the earth guilty of practices more shocking and bloody
than are the people of the United States, at this very hour.287
Here was Douglass, someone whose race had been disparaged by white
supremacists as savage, calling the whites themselves “savages” and citizens of a
nation that was “more shocking and bloody” than any nation “on the earth.” That
these rebukes were delivered on the Fourth of July made them all the more damning.
Douglass was calling upon his white male audience to resolve the terrible hypocrisy
that soiled their achievement of “National Independence” and “political freedom.”
He was, in essence, calling upon white men to fulfill their role as gentlemen and to
reject their hypermasculine impulses for domination.
In “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro,” Douglass did not directly
discuss issues of constitutional interpretation. He did not mean to introduce a method
of jurisprudence when he spoke before the large crowd in Rochester in 1852. A
political activist, he was trying to rouse them to support the cause of civil rights for
blacks. Be that as it may, what Douglass did furnish in his speech in effect served as
a compelling alternative to Chief Justice Taney’s theory of originalism. Taney had
proudly affirmed that blacks were never intended by the Founding Fathers to be
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included in the We the People, the beings in whose name the Constitution was
written. The basis for his opinion was that he could not accept the conclusion that
the Founding Fathers were hypocrites. Taney explained that the Founding Fathers’
decision to enslave blacks was not hobbled by moral regret. According to Taney,
slavery of black people was the rightful expression of the ideology of white
supremacy. Slavery of blacks was the natural and morally legitimate outcome of a
powerful white race whose instincts impelled it to dominate and exploit a weaker
black race.
Douglass, on the other hand, had argued that the Founding Fathers were
magnificent hypocrites. From his vantage, they had supported a practice of chattel
slavery that was incongruous with the very principles of freedom and independence
on which they professed to have founded their republic. Douglass suggested that it
fell to the sons to resolve this contradiction by ridding America of slavery. In other
words, Douglass in his “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro” had fashioned
the theory that the Founding Fathers had created principles of freedom that they
expected their sons to honor on behalf of blacks even as the Founders themselves
failed to realize fully.
CONCLUSION
The year was 1968. It was the year that the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 288 In that case, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a federal law that forbade racial discrimination in real estate
transactions.289 The Court’s decision was handed down about 150 years after
Frederick Douglass’s birth. Yet the power of the great man’s words endured. For he
was invoked as a moral authority by one of the Court’s justices, William O. Douglas,
whose surname was, in a stroke of serendipity, nearly identical to Frederick
Douglass’s, missing only the additional s in the latter’s name. In his concurrence,
Justice Douglas recited Douglass’s words from “The Color Line,” a speech from
1881.290 These words from “The Color Line” were included in Justice Douglas’s
concurrence:
Of all the races and varieties of men which have suffered from this
feeling, the colored people of this country have endured most.
They can resort to no disguises which will enable them to escape
its deadly aim.291
Justice Douglas also excerpted from “The Color Line” Douglass’s mention of
manhood as a political trope.
[The black man] may not now be bought and sold like a beast in
the market, but he is the trammeled victim of a prejudice, well
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calculated to repress his manly ambition, paralyze his energies,
and make him a dejected and spiritless man . . . .292
Justice Douglas did not call attention to Douglass’s reference to “manly ambition.”
For the case before him did not require Justice Douglas to reflect formally on the
meaning of manliness.
Nevertheless, as this Article has suggested, manliness formed an integral
part of Douglass’s understanding of racial justice and the Constitution. An
invigorated sense of his manhood was what had helped Douglass to challenge the
brutality of the slavebreaker Covey, and, later, to challenge the Supreme Court itself.
When Justice Douglas quoted Douglass’s reference to manhood, the former was in
effect invoking something more powerful and salient to constitutional interpretation
and ideas of justice than may have been apparent to the Court.
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